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Idea Protection and 
the Copyright Clause: 
The Problems of 
Preemption 
C
opyright does not protect ideas, 
but only the expression of ideas. I 
This distinction, long recognized 
in copyright law as the idea-expression 
dichotomy, was given express statutory 
recognition in the 1976 Copyright Act. 2 
Section 102(b) provides: "In no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such a work." 3 
While ideas have never received federal 
copyright protection, state law doctrines 
have traditionally provided protection for 
such creative investments, subject to su-
premacy clause and first amendment limi-
tations. 
Copyright preemption issues invariably 
arose as state law became a source of pro-
tection for intellectual property. In Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. StlfJe! Co. 4 and Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,5 the Su-
preme Court adopted a sweeping standard 
offederal preemption, suggesting that state 
protection of intellectual property would 
be preempted whenever it conflicted, even 
indirectly, with the objectives of the fed-
eral copyright and patent laws. However, 
in Goldstein v. Calzfornia6 and Kewanee 
Co. v. Bicron Oil Corp., 7 the Supreme 
Court curbed the preemptive sweep of the 
Sears-Compco doctrine and allowed for 
state protection in all areas which Congress 
had left "unattended."s 
Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Revi-
sion Act9 was intended to provide a statu-
tory resolution of the copyright preemption 
issues. The section effectively abolished 
common law copyright and established 
that state laws regulating copyright gen-
erally would be preempted. 10 The avowed 
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purpose was to provide "a single Federal 
system" of statutory copyright that "would 
greatly improve the operation of the copy-
right law and would be much more effec-
tive in carrying out the basic constitutional 
aims of uniformity and the promotion of 
writing and scholarship." II Section 301 
attempts to state this principle "in the 
clearest and most unequivocal language 
possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable 
misinterpretation of its unqualified inten-
tion that Congress shall act preemptively, 
and to avoid the development of any vague 
borderline areas between State and Federal 
protection." 12 Unfortunately, this intent 
was not effected and the determination of 
preemption under Section 301 is still sub-
ject to some very diverse interpretations. 
Background 
The United States Constitution states, 
"Congress shall have the power ... To 
Promote the Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." 13 The constitutional limitation 
of copyright to works of "Authors" 14 has 
been construed to impose a threshold re-
quirement of an act of authorship - the 
work must be original with him. This low 
level threshold has no real concern for 
aesthetic merit or creative genius, serving 
mainly to prevent copyrighting of public 
domain material. 15 Copyright is also lim-
ited to "Writings," 16 which has been de-
fined to include any physical renderings of 
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic 
labor. 17 The primary purpose of copyright 
protection is to encourage contributions to 
recorded knowledge. Reward in the form 
of property rights to the author is a secon-
dary consideration; the limited monopoly 
created being justified by the public inter-
est in the creation and dissemination of in-
tellectual works. IS As the Supreme Court 
recently reiterated in Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,19 this 
limited grant achieves an important public 
purpose. "It is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors 
by the provision of a special reward, and to 
allow the public access to the products of 
their genius after the limited period of ex-
clusive control has expired." 20 The idea-
expression dichotomy balances these two 
competing interests by limiting copyright 
protection to the author's expression, not 
the underlying ideas or facts he expresses. 21 
This limit on an author's control is argu-
ably necessary. Were an author able to pre-
vent subsequent authors from using con-
cepts, ideas, or facts contained in his or her 
work, the creative process would wither 
and scholars would be forced into unpro-
ductive replication of the research of their 
predecessors. 22 First amendment princi-
ples are also brought into play, as a broad 
dissemination of principles, ideas, and fac-
tual information is crucial to the robust 
public debate and informed citizenry that 
are "the essence of self-government." 23 
The above-stated principles are part of 
the underlying problem of preemption. To 
allow state protection of ideas and other 
subject matter specifically excluded from 
federal statutory protection may contravene 
the purpose of the copyright clause and vio-
late the constitutional allocation of powers 
between federal and state authority.24 Ifit 
is determined that Congress, in balancing 
the competing interests in copyrighting, re-
jected the protection ofideas and other ex-
cluded subject matter under Section 102(b) 
as repugnant to the policy of the copyright 
clause, then preemption would be man-
dated under the supremacy clause,25 re-
gardless of whether or not it is compelled 
under Section 301. If, however, the object 
of copyrighting is "simply to separate inter-
ests the law will protect from those it will 
not, and define the levels and conditions of 
protection accorded," there would be no jus-
tification for the federal system to intrude 
into state common law property systems 
and preempt rules that serve to protect an 
author's investment in creative activity.26 
Professor Goldstein suggests that the only 
possible justification for striking down 
state property systems is that, under the 
supremacy clause, they impermissibly in-
terfere with the objects of the federal copy-
right system.27 He finds little support for 
such a proposition, for while the Supreme 
Court had adopted a presumption ofinter-
ference in the Sears-Compeo doctrine, they 
have since retreated from that position. 28 
Advocates of hardline federal preemption 
argue that the subject matter of Section 
102(b) was meant to belong in the public 
domain, and to allow state law to prohibit 
the copying of public domain material 
would contravene the federal copyright 
scheme.29 Goldstein believes that this ap-
proach confuses the patent and copyright 
schemes. While patent has high threshold 
requirements for protection, copyright re-
quires a minimal showing of originality, 
no more rigorous than the standards em-
ployed by state doctrines. "There is noth-
ing in the history of ... state laws to sug-
gest that state courts or legislatures are any 
more disposed than the federal courts or 
Congress to extend monopolies into areas 
where they do not belong." 30 
Preemption Before the 1976 Act 
The Supreme Court considered the ques-
tion of federal preemption of copyright for 
the first time in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stlffel Co., 31 and its companion case Compeo 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 32 In each, 
the Court reversed a decision under state 
unfair competition law that prohibited the 
copying of an unpatentable light fixture. 
In Compeo, Justice Black articulated a 
sweeping standard of federal preemption. 
When an article is unprotected by a 
patent or a copyright, state law may 
not forbid others to copy that article. 
To forbid copying would interfere 
with the federal policy, found in Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in 
the implementing federal statutes, of 
allowing free access to copy whatever 
the federal patent and copyright laws 
leave in the public domain. 33 
Copyrights and patents were envisaged as 
the only two constitutionally authorized 
exceptions to a pervasive federal scheme of 
free competition and imitation. 34 State 
courts, dissatisfied with the results in Sears-
Compeo, resorted to artificial distinctions 
between "copying" and "misappropria-
tion" to evade federal preemption.35 
Goldstein v. Cahfornia36 and Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 37 curbed the Sears-
Compeo preemptive sweep. In Goldstein, 
ChiefJ ustice Burger upheld the validity of 
a state criminal law, even though the law 
extended protection equivalent to copy-
right to subject matter that had not yet re-
ceived federal copyright protection. The 
standard used to determine whether the 
federal statute required preemption was 
found in Hines v. Davidowitz: whether the 
challenged state law "stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress." 38 The Court held that the Consti-
tution's grant of copyright power was not 
exclusive and that states were free to pro-
tect published "writings" that did not fall 
within the scope of federal copyright law. 39 
The scope of the federal law was to be mea-
sured by the coverage of the statute rather 
than the purpose of the constitutional 
clause. The Court recognized, however, 
that "a conflict would develop if a state at-
tempted to protect that which Congress in-
tended to be free from restraint or to free 
that which Congress had protected."40 
Goldstein has been criticized because it 
justifies state law protection regardless of 
the subject matter and ignores the copy-
right clause limitation on monopoly to 
"limited times." 41 Professor Goldstein ap-
plauds both Goldstein and Kewanee for re-
storing federal laws to their historically 
limited ambit and renewing the vigor of 
state doctrines. 42 
Kewanee allowed trade secret protection 
for processes that were disqualified from 
federal patent protection under one of the 
patent law's novelty requirements. 43 The 
Court expanded the potential scope of state 
intellectual property legislation even fur-
ther than had been done in Goldstein when 
it concluded that the "only limitation on 
the states is that in regulating the area of 
patents and copyrights, they do not con-
flict with the operation of the laws in this 
area passed by Congress." 44 Thus it would 
seem that even if the Goldstein inquiry 
showed that a subject matter has not been 
left unattended by Congress, a further in-
quiry must be made. Kewanee compared 
the respective economic objectives and ef-
fects of the state and federal law, and the 
fundamental preemption issue thereby be-
came "not whether state law reaches mat-
ters also subject to federal regulation, but 
whether the two laws function harmoni-
ously rather than discordantly."45 
The Effect of Section 301 
In the wake of the liberal authorization 
of state intellectual property protection af-
forded by Goldstein and Kewanee, Section 
301 of the 1976 Copyright Act was en-
acted.46 The section is intended "to make 
clear, consistent with the 1964 Supreme 
Court decisions in Sears . . . and Compco 
. . . that preemption does not extend to 
causes of action, or subject matter outside 
the scope of the revised Federal Copyright 
Statute."47 Legislative history on the pre-
emptive purpose behind Section 301 is less 
than satisfactory due in part to a last min-
ute deletion of a list of state doctrines 
deemed non-equivalent to copyright, and 
therefore not subject to preemption. 48 The 
deletion was apparently intended to con-
form the section to the Justice Department's 
opinion that continued viability of the mis-
appropriation doctrine would nullifY the 
preemptive effect of the section. However, 
this purpose was lost in the ensuing discus-
sion. The Congressman that proposed the 
deletion agreed that he was not trying to 
change the laws of the states that had al-
ready adopted the misappropriation doc-
trine, stating "I am trying to have this bill 
leave the state law alone."49 
The muddled legislative history regard-
ing the intended preemptive scope of Sec-
tion 301 places even more emphasis on 
dealing with the section as enacted. Sec-
tion 301 creates a two-pronged test to de-
termine preemption: (1) Does the subject 
matter under consideration come within 
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the subject matter of copyright as specified 
by Sections 102 and 103? (2) Is the state 
right involved equivalent to any of the ex-
clusive rights provided under Section 106? 
Both of these questions must be answered 
in the affirmative for a state law to be pre-
empted. If either question is answered in 
the negative, Section 301 offers no impedi-
ment to the exercise of state power. 
(1) The Subject Matter of 
Copyright 
Under Section 301(a), state-created 
rights, even if "within the general scope of 
copyright," are not subject to preemption 
unless they vest in "works of authorship 
that are fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression and come within the subject mat-
ter of copyright as specified by Sections 
102 and 103." 50 Nimmer suggests that 
this is a codification of Goldstein which in-
dicates that "categories of writings which 
Congress has ... brought within the scope 
of the federal statute" are no longer eligible 
for protection. 51 
The subject matter of copyright is never 
explicitly defined. Section 102(a) sets out 
the general area of copyright subject mat-
ter. It states that copyright protection sub-
sists "in original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression," and 
lists seven categories for "works of author-
ship." Section 102(b) provides that "copy-
right protection for an original work of 
authorship does not extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is 
embodied." Since copyright protection is 
not available for these matters, they are 
arguably not within the subject matter of 
copyright, and state law protection of them 
would not be preempted. Whereas Gold-
stein would require an inquiry to deter-
mine whether Congress had left the area 
unattended or had expressly decided to 
deny protection, thereby preempting state 
protection, Section 301 provides no basis 
for such an inquiry. "Even if Congress con-
sidered protecting certain subject matter 
and consciously and explicitly determined 
that such subject matter should best be left 
unprotected, the language of Section 301 
by itself would not require preemption." 52 
Therefore, the crucial issue is whether the 
items listed in Section 102(b) fall within 
the subject matter of copyright. 
Abrams and Nimmer both subscribe to 
the view that the items listed in Section 
102(b) are "works of authorship" as used to 
describe the subject matter of copyright. 
Section 102(b), as the codification of the 
idea-expression dichotomy, serves as a limi-
tation on the protection extended by the 
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statutory monopoly of copyright to subject 
matter included under Section 102(a), not 
a definition of excluded subject matter. 53 
Professor Goldstein is of the opinion that 
Section 102(b) specifies certain elements 
contained in original works of authorship 
which are not protected. 54 Since these ele-
ments are excluded from "works of author-
ship" under Section 102(b), they do not 
fall within the subject matter of copyright. 
This theory has support in Bromhall v. 
Rorvik, 55 which upheld the plaintiff's state 
law claim for misappropriation of the ideas 
contained in his unpublished doctoral the-
sis. The court held that since copyright 
Concurrent 
state-federal 
protection is in the 
best interests of the 
public . .. 
protects only the expression of ideas, and 
not the ideas themselves, the claims being 
considered were not entitled to protection 
under the Act and hence were not pre-
empted. 56 The same analysis was used in 
Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management 
Systems. 57 Rand McNally argued, among 
other things, that the defendant had copied 
the plaintiff's procedures, processes, and 
systems for calculating mileage data in pre-
paring roadway mileage charts. The court 
stated that, "[a]s these procedures are ex-
pressly excluded from copyright protec-
tion, Section 102(b), they fail the subject 
matter test of Section 301(a) and are not 
preempted." 58 Werlin v. Readers Digest 
Association, Inc., 59 goes even further than 
the above cases by preventing preemption 
of state law protection of ideas whether or 
not the ideas are embodied in a copyright-
able work. Werlin held that the state quasi-
contract claim was not preempted and that 
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for 
the idea of her article. "Werlin's submis-
sion to RDA was both an article and an 
idea. To the extent it was an article, it en-
joyed federal copyright protection; to the 
extent it was an idea, it enjoyed no federal 
copyright protection but limited state law 
protection." 60 
However, other courts have consistently 
treated facts, research and the like as. being 
unprotectable, either by copyright or com-
mon law. "Where, as here, historical facts, 
themes, and research have been deliberately 
exempted from the scope of copyright pro-
tection to vindicate the overriding goal of 
encouraging contributions to recorded 
knowledge, the states are preempted from 
removing such materials from the public 
domain."61 The same analysis could be 
used to preempt idea protection, as all the 
items listed in Section 102(b) are arguably 
designated for the public domain. 
(2) Equivalent Rights 
The second prong of the test to deter-
mine preemption is whether the state right 
involved is equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights provided under Section 106.62 
If the state right is infringed by an act that 
constitutes copyright infringement, such 
as unauthorized reproduction, perfor-
mance, distribution, or display, then the 
right should be deemed equivalent and 
subject to preemption if within the subject 
matter of copyright. Even if ideas are con-
sidered within the subject matter of copy-
right, they could be protected by non-
equivalent state rights. The main problem 
here is defining the term "equivalent." 
Two different approaches have devel-
oped. The first is a comparison of the ele-
ments of proof. If an added element must 
be established to prove a violation of the 
state right, then the right is not preempted. 
The second approach examines the impact 
and effect of the right and remedy. The 
right must be qualitatively different from 
that granted by copyright to escape pre-
emption. If the effect of the state right 
would be to place the defendant under the 
same restrictions from copying and use as 
would the copyright laws, then that right 
should be preempted. 
The doctrine of misappropriation is the 
most problematic source of litigation in 
this area. While one House Committee 
report stated that misappropriation was 
"nothing more than copyright protection 
under another name," 63 a later Committee 
report reached the opposite conclusion: 
"Misappropriation is not necessarily syn-
onymous with copyright infringement, and 
thus a cause of action labeled as misappro-
priation is not preempted if it is in fact 
based neither on a right within the general 
scope of copyright as specified by Section 
106 nor on a right equivalent thereto ... "64 
The doctrine of misappropriation is in-
voked when a person imitates or uses a 
work developed at the expense of another, 
thereby converting the other's investment. 
The doctrine has been used to guard against 
unauthorized use of public domain mate-
rials. First established in International News 
Service v. Associated Press,65 the Court al-
lowed state law protection of "hot news" 
through a claim of unfair competition, even 
though the news was not copyrightable. 
The scope of the state law protection au-
thorized was limited, only lasting long 
enough for I.N.S. to retain the financial in-
centive to be the first to gather and dissem-
inate the news. The Court carefully bal-
anced the copyright and first amendment 
issues, and the case stands as an example of 
the benefits of allowing state protection of 
matter excluded from copyright protec-
tion under Section 102(b). 
Misappropriation is generally agreed to 
have these elements: (I) creation of plain-
tiff's product through extensive time, la-
bor, skill, and money; (2) defendant's use 
of that product in competition with the 
plaintiff, thereby gaining special advantage 
since the defendant is not burdened with 
the developmental expenses incurred by 
the plaintiff; and (3) commercial damage 
to the plaintiff. To the extent that the mis-
appropriation doctrine merely prevents 
reproduction and distribution, the rights 
being protected appear to be equivalent to 
those protected by Section 106. 66 However, 
when direct competition exists, misappro-
priation seemingly only protects "the lim-
ited right of a commercial enterprise to be 
free from unfair competitive practices that 
deprive it of a fair return on its work and 
investment." 67 
The grant of limited rights against the 
unfair acts of a competitor, not against the 
public at large, would not appear to con-
flict with federal policy. According to the 
House Report, however, misappropriation 
seems to be preserved only to the extent it 
protects against a pattern of unfair use by a 
competitor. 68 They reason that the element 
of competition is almost always present in 
infringement situations, and really adds 
nothing further to the rights contained in 
Section 106, whereas a pattern of unfair use 
by a competitor would be non-equivalent. 
Judicial interpretations vary. The Court 
in Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting 
Companies69 stated that the New York un-
fair competition law was preempted to the 
extent that the claim relied on the misap-
propriation branch of the law, citing Dur-
ham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy COrp.,70 but 
to the extent that the claim relied on "pass-
ing off," it was not asserting rights equiva-
lent to those protected by copyright and 
therefore would not be preempted. "Pass-
ing off" generally requires a showing of 
consumer deception and appropriation of 
good will. As long as a strong showing 
of deception is made, the element of "pass-
ing off" actually does protect a right dif-
ferent in kind from the Section 106 rights. 
However, if the claim was based mainly on 
a good will dilution theory, it arguably 
should not survive preemption. 71 Roy Ex-
port Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 72 
upheld a state unfair competition claim on 
the basis of the extra element of commer-
cial immorality. "The fact that the basis 
for the finding of unfair competition may 
have partly overlapped the basis for the 
finding of statutory copyright infringe-
ment is insufficient to find the unfair com-
petition claim preempted where, as here, 
the law of unfair competition serves to 
compliment, rather than conflict with, 
federal law." 73 
Conclusion 
Nothing definitive about the present 
status of state idea protection can be said in 
light of the discrepant results reached in 
the application of Section 301. However, a 
proper analysis of the preemption problem 
cannot be reached using Section 30 I prin-
ciples alone. It is hard, ifnot impossible, to 
evaluate the proper scope of preemption 
under Section 30 I without determining 
the purposes and policy behind the copy-
right clause and the current Copyright Act. 
The two inquiries suggested in Goldstein 
should be required to determine if the sub-
ject matter is covered by the Copyright Act, 
and if not, whether it had been left unat-
tended or deliberately excluded from pro-
tection by Congress. Limitations on state 
law protection should also be defined to 
keep the states extending monopolies be-
yond the public's interest, as well as some 
durational limitations.74 However, upon 
review, state protection of ideas and the ex-
cluded subject matter of Section 102(b) 
under the current Act has never been offen-
sive to the policy of promoting progress and 
expanding the contributions to recorded 
knowledge; rather, state protection oper-
ates to relieve injustices that would be per-
mitted if such protection were preempted. 
Concurrent state-federal protection is in 
the best interests of the public, and should 
not be dismissed without a thorough anal-
ysis of the policies of the copyright clause 
and the effects of denying such protection 
in a capitalistic, reward-motivated society. 
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